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Can a Political Subdivision Sue Its Parent State
Under Federal Law?
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INTRODUCTION
Municipal government is often the closest level of government to
the people, who look to their local government for police and fire
protection, to maintain the roads and streetlights, and to collect the
garbage. While relatively few people have regular contact with federal

* I would like to thank my note editors Peter Cuniffe and Mike Lechliter for their
valuable help. Thanks also to the excellent Volume 103 Notes Office.
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regulatory agencies, almost everyone has received a parking ticket
from his local government. Few stop to think, however, about the role
these political subdivisions of states play in our federal system. They
offer a miniature version of federalism on the state level, dividing the
power of the state and placing many important decisions in the hands
of representatives closer to the people. Although cities, counties, and
school districts substantially affect the lives of the average citizen,
their relationship to state governments under the Federal Constitution
is far from clear. States create political subdivisions, and thus have
broad powers over them, but subdivisions do not always agree with
their parent states' actions. Constitutional problems emerge when a
subdivision thinks the laws of its parent state conflict with the
Constitution or with federal law. Can the subdivision turn to the
federal courts and federal law for protection from its parent state?

Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh1

is a leading example of Supreme

Court jurisprudence on municipalities. The Pennsylvania statute at
issue in the case authorized the larger of two contiguous cities to
annex the smaller. 2 Pittsburgh followed the statutory procedures to
annex Allegheny and the annexation passed the referendum required
by the statute. 3 Residents of Allegheny and the Allegheny city
government filed suit to stop the annexation, lost in the Pennsylvania
courts, and appealed to the Supreme Court. 4 The plaintiffs pursued
theories

that

the

annexation

impaired

a contract

between

the

municipal corporation and its taxpayers5 and that the enlarged city
would subject them to higher taxes, thus depriving them of property
without due process of law. 6 The Court upheld the annexation because
of the broad authority given to states to create and manage their
political subdivisions, which are "created as convenient agencies for

1. 207 U.S. 161 (1907). Other cases in this line include: Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil Co.,
250 U.S. 394 (1919) ; Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304 (1898) ; Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith,
100 U.S. 514 (1879); and Commissioners of Laramie County v. Commissioners of Albany
County, 92 U.S. 307 (1875).
2. Hunter, 207

U.S. at 161.

3. Id.

at

164-65, 174.

4. Id.

at

165-71.

at 177. The Contract Clause of the Constitution says that "No State shall . . . pass
any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Justice Moody
dismissed the Hunter plaintiffs' "novel proposition" by saying "[i]t is difficult to deal with a
proposition of this kind except by saying it is not true." Hunter, 207 U.S. at 177. The
plaintiffs argued this tenuous theory because the Court had previously rejected the theory
that the charter of a municipal corporation is a contract between the municipality and the
state. See id.; see also City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 142 U.S. 79, 91
(1891) ("[T]he municipality, being a mere agent of the state, stands in its governmental or
public character in no contract relation with its sovereign, at whose pleasure its charter may
be amended, changed, or revoked, without the impairment of any constitutional
obligation.").
5. Id.

6. Hunter, 207

U.S. at 177-78.
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exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be
entrusted to them. "7 The state decides the nature and extent of the
powers of a political subdivision, so it "may modify or withdraw all
such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it
itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial
area, unite the whole or part of it with another municipality, repeal the
charter or destroy the corporation. " 8 Because the state controls its
subdivisions' borders and powers to make contracts, it can modify a
subdivision's borders or contracts without violating the Constitution.
City of Trenton v. New Jersey,9 the other leading case in this area,
was a suit by a subdivision against its parent state. Trenton purchased
the right to draw water from the Delaware River from a water
company, which had received the right by grant from the state. 1 0 The
state subsequently required all entities drawing water from rivers to
pay a fee if they drew over a specified amount. 1 1 The city protested
that the fee impaired the contract it had with the water company and
deprived the city of property without due process of law. 1 2 The Court
followed the reasoning in

Hunter

in denying the city's claim, saying,

"[t]he power of the state, unrestrained by the contract clause or the
Fourteenth Amendment, over the rights and property of cities held
and used for 'governmental purposes' cannot be questioned. " 1 3
While political subdivisions clearly play a subordinate role to states
in the federal system, they are not completely subject to the whims of
the state legislatures. For example, a state may revoke the charter of a
political subdivision, but it must preserve a means for the subdivision's
creditors to satisfy their claims. 1 4 The Court has also recognized some

7.

Id.

at 178.

8. Id. at 178-79; see also City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) ("[T]he
state may withhold, grant or withdraw powers as it sees fit."); New Orleans Water Wo rks, 142
U.S. at 91.
9. 262 U.S. 182 (1923). It was heard in conjunction with City of Newark v. New Jersey,
262 U.S. 192 (1923). The cases on state power over municipalities are often called the
Hunter-Trenton line of cases, reflecting these two cases' leading role in the law. See, e.g. ,
Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1068 (5th Cir. 1979).
10. Trenton, 262

11.

Id.

U.S. at 184.

at 183-84.

12 See id. at 186. The Court does not explicitly state what the city's arguments were, but
its opinion is directed towards the Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.
13. Id. at 188. The Court employed a distinction between the rights and property of the
city used for governmental purposes and those used for its proprietary purposes. The Court
recognized that " [t]he basis for the distinction is difficult to state, and there is no established
rule for the determination of what belongs to one or the other class." Id. at 191-92. The
distinction "has largely been abandoned." S. Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Township of
Washington, 790 F.2d 500, 505 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Indian Towing Co. v. United States,
350 U.S. 61 (1955)).
14. Port of Mobile v. United States ex rel. Watson, 116 U.S. 289, 305 (1886).
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limits to states' broad authority over determining the boundaries of
their subdivisions. The Supreme Court reversed a finding of summary
judgment in favor of the Alabama Legislature in a suit that challenged
its new boundaries of Tuskegee, which excluded all but four African
American citizens from the city by changing the city's shape from a
square to a "strangely irregular twenty-eight-sided figure." 1 5 The
Court held that this redrawing of the boundaries of a city stated a
cause of action for violation of the African-American residents' voting
rights under the Fifteenth Amendment. 1 6 In doing so, the Court
limited the holdings of Hunter and

Trenton, explaining:
Hunter

a correct reading of the seemingly unconfined dicta of

and

kindred cases is not that the State has plenary power to manipulate in
every conceivable way, for every conceivable purpose, the affairs of its
municipal

corporations,

unrestrained

by

the

but

rather

particular

that

the

prohibitions

State's
of

authority

the

is

Constitution

considered in those cases.17

The state's power over its political subdivisions is therefore not
completely unlimited.
These seemingly conflicting precedents have produced confusion

in the federal circuit courts of appeals when a political subdivision sues
its parent state. Some circuits follow a per se rule that political
subdivisions cannot sue their parent states under any constitutional
provision. 1 8 Other circuits have reexamined the

Hunter

and

Trenton

precedents and now allow suits by political subdivisions 1 9 based on the
Supremacy Clause. 2 0 Others have noted the confusion and avoided

15. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960). States possess broad powers over
the boundaries of their subdivisions, so state decisions on boundary lines are generally
constitutional unless they involve race, see id. , or another important federal interest, like the
Establishment Clause, see Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S.
687 (1994) (holding unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause a New York law which
carved a school district around a community of Satmar Hasidic Jews).
16.

Id.

at 347-48.

17. 364 U.S. at 344.
18. Palomar Pomerado Health Sys. v. Belshe, 180 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1999); Gwin Area
Cmty. Sch. v. Michigan, 741 F.2d 840 (6th Cir. 1984).
19. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619 (10th Cir. 1998); Rogers v.
Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1979).
20. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
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taking a stand on the issue, 2 1 and the Second Circuit has taken an
ambiguous stance.2 2
The Ninth Circuit has taken the lead in advancing a per se rule
prohibiting political subdivisions from suing their parent states, most
recently in Palomar Pomerado Health System v. Belshe.23 Palomar
Pomerado, a health care district created by California, sued the state,
claiming that the state regulations for reimbursements for care given
to those insured under California's Medi-Cal program compensated
the district less than required by federal Medicaid law.2 4 The Ninth
Circuit ruled that, as a political subdivision, Palomar Pomerado "lacks
standing to bring an action against the state in federal court - at least
to the extent that its action challenges the validity of state regulations
on due process and Supremacy Clause grounds." 2 5 The Sixth Circuit
follows a similar per se rule.26

21. City of Charleston v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 57 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Alabama, 791 F.2d 1450 (11th Cir. 1986).
22. The Second Circuit has decided three cases on this issue with somewhat conflicting
results. It held that political subdivisions could not challenge a state statute under the
Fourteenth Amendment, hinting at a per se rule. New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 929
(2d Cir. 1973). The same term, the court upheld a district court's dismissal of a city's suit
because "it had no standing to assert constitutional claims." Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d
1090, 1100 (2d Cir. 1973). The court, however, said that a political subdivision would possibly
have standing to assert a Fifth Amendment claim. Id. at 1 100-01. A later case allowed the
City of New York to join the governor of New York and the state corrections commissioner
as third party defendants in a suit by prison inmates alleging overcrowding at city jails.
Benjamin v. Malcolm, 803 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1986). The court did not analyze the issue on
Hunter or Trenton grounds, but found the city met Article III standing requirements. Id. at
54. These cases taken together leave the state of Second Circuit law unclear.
23. 180 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1999). The named defendant was Kimberly Belshe, Director
of the California Department of Health Services. Id. at 1104. The court found that the action
against Belshe was "under the category of actions against state officials that are in fact
actions against the state." Id. at 1108. This Note similarly treats cases against state officials,
such as the governor or a director of a state agency, as constituting suits against the state. See
also Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Kirk, 91 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1996)
vacated by reh 'g en bane, 109 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 1997); City of S. Lake Tahoe v. Cal. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 625 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1980). At one time, though, the Ninth Circuit
hinted in dicta that a complete bar on suits may not be warranted. See San Diego Unified
Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306, 1309 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) ("While there
are broad dicta that a political subdivision may never sue its maker on constitutional
grounds, we doubt that the rule is so broad." (citation omitted)).
24. Palomar, 180 F.3d at 1106. Medi-Cal is California's health insurance program for the
poor. Id.
25. Id. at 1108. Although the opinion appears to leave room for suits based on other
grounds, it specifically denies suits based on the Supremacy Clause. Id. The rule is a per se
rule, then, for cases arising under the Supremacy Clause. Because all challenges to state laws
on federal grounds involve the Supremacy Clause, the rule is in effect a per se rule barring
all suits by political subdivisions. Judge Hawkins concurred but urged the Ninth Circuit to
reexamine its position in light of the Rogers and Branson School District decisions, which are
discussed infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text. Id. at 1109-11 (Hawkins, J., concurring).
26. Gwin Area Cmty. Sch. v. Michigan, 741 F.2d 840, 844 (6th Cir. 1984) ("The school
district, as a political subdivision of the State of Michigan, was in no position to attack state
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Two circuits allow suits by political subdivisions against their
parent states based on the Supremacy Clause. 2 7 The Fifth Circuit was
the first to allow suits of this kind when it permitted a school district to
challenge a Texas statute requiring school districts to participate in the
federal school breakfast program if they had one school where ten
percent of students were eligible for the federal program.2 8 Unlike the
Ninth Circuit, the court held that the issue was not one of standing.2 9
The court read the Hunter and Trenton line of cases as standing for
"the substantive holdings that the Constitution does not interfere in a
state's internal political organization."30 The school district was able to
proceed with its suit because its claim was "that Congress, exercising
its power under Article I, has interfered with Texas's internal political
organization " and was not based on the Constitution itself.31 The court
found that the school district met the "criteria normally governing
standing to sue in federal court. "32 The Tenth Circuit joined the Fifth
Circuit in allowing suits based on the Supremacy Clause, holding that
suits

by subdivisions

based

on the structural protection

Supremacy Clause were not precluded by

Trenton,

of the

which barred only

suits based on protections of individual rights, such as those
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Contract Clause.33
This Note argues that political subdivisions should be able to seek
protection from their parent states under the Supremacy Clause when

action as violative of the United States Constitution."). The Sixth Circuit, however, at one
time found that a local school district had standing to sue the state board of education when
it alleged that the board transferred jurisdiction over a predominantly white area to an
adjoining district because the transfer would violate the rights of students to attend
integrated schools and possibly subject the school board to lawsuits. Akron Bd. of Educ. v.
State Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 1285 (6th Cir. 1974). Gwin A rea is the Circuit's latest ruling on
the issue, so it governs.
27. See, e.g. , Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619 (10th Cir. 1998); Rogers
v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1979).
28. Rogers, 588 F.2d at 1059, 1071. The school district argued that the state law was
contrary to the federal school breakfast program. Id.
29.

Id.

at 1069.

30.

Id.

at 1070.

31.

Id.

32. Id. at 1067. The school district's case, however, ultimately failed on the merits
because the court found no conflict between the state and federal laws. Id. at 1071-73.
33. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 628-29 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Despite
the sweeping breadth of Justice Cardozo's language, both Williams and Trenton stand only
for the limited proposition that a municipality may not bring a constitutional challenge
against its creating state when the constitutional provision that supplies the basis for the
complaint was written to protect individual rights, as opposed to collective or structural
rights."). The case involved the question of whether alterations to Colorado's trusteeships of
public lands violated the terms of a trust established by Congress when the state entered the
Union. Once again the court found that school district met the Article III requirements for
standing, id. at 630-31, yet decided the case on the merits against the school district, id. at
643.
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alleging a conflict between state law and any federal law, be it the
Constitution, treaty, or a federal statute. Part I argues that the
precedential cases like

Hunter

and

Trenton

were limited to the

constitutional provisions in question and therefore did not bar all suits
under the Supremacy Clause. Part II shows that the issue is one of
constitutional protection of political subdivisions, rather than Article
III standing, which had a completely different meaning when Hunter
and Trenton were decided. Part III finds that suits based on the
Supremacy Clause best fit into the dual nature of our federalist system
and rejects some possible counterarguments based on the idea of state
sovereignty.

Part

IV

shows

that

subdivisions'

need

to

protect

themselves supports allowing them to sue their parent states. Part V
examines the proper rationale for Supremacy Clause suits by political
subdivisions and rejects the reasoning of the Fifth and Tenth Circuits,
advocating instead a rationale based solely on the nature of the
Supremacy Clause.
I.

SUITS BASED ON THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE ARE PERMITIED

BECAUSE THE CASES IN THE TRENTON LINE WERE LIMITED TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSES IN QUESTION
This Part argues that suits by political subdivisions based on the
Supremacy Clause are constitutional because precedent in this area
has disallowed only those suits by political subdivisions based on the
Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. These decisions do
not

preclude

suits

by

political

subdivisions

under

different

constitutional clauses. Their holdings were based on the fact that
political subdivisions hold property and make contracts at the pleasure
of the state, and so the state may take the subdivisions' property or
alter their contracts without constitutional limitations. Because this
logic does not apply to suits based on other constitutional provisions
or federal statutes coupled with the Supremacy Clause, political
subdivisions should have their cases resolved on the merits.
A review of the Supreme Court's holdings in this area shows that
they were limited to the clauses at issue in the cases, the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Contract Clause. In

New Orleans Water Works,

one of the earliest cases in this area, the Court held that the state
could alter a contract between a city and a water company because
"there was no contract between the city and the Water Works
Company

which

was

protected

by

the

constitutional

clause

in

question."34 The city, as an agent of the state, could make no contracts
in its public character that were not subject to modification by the

34. City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works, 142 U.S. 79, 92 (1891).
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state.35 Regarding the city's claim of deprivation of property without
due process, the court held that any property the city held "was not
such a vested right as was beyond the control of the legislature. "36 The
holding in the case was substantive: all contracts the city made and all
property the city held were subject to the control of the state
legislature.37 A political subdivision,
protection

of

the

Constitution

therefore, cannot claim the

under

the

Contract

Clause

for

modification of its contracts and the Fourteenth Amendment for
deprivation of its property.38

Hunter

raised similar issues and came to a similar substantive

conclusion about a political subdivision's rights against its parent state.
A political subdivision cannot look to the Contract Clause to protect
its contracts or to the Fourteenth Amendment to protect its property
because "[t]he number, nature and duration of the powers conferred
upon [municipal] corporations and the territory over which they shall
be exercised rests

[sic] in

the absolute discretion of the state."39 The

state was free to force the merger of Pittsburgh and Allegheny
because the laws giving

political subdivisions their powers and

boundaries were not "contract[ s] with the State within the meaning of
the Federal Constitution."40 The Court mentioned a long list of actions
which a state could take without violating the Constitution, a list that
the Court later found to be the "seemingly unconfined dicta of

Hunter. "41

The list, however, is quite confined and uncontroversial.

The state can alter the boundaries of its subdivisions, take their
property, alter their contracts, and define the scope of the
subdivisions' powers.42 This rule, though, does not allow a State to
force

its

subdivisions

to

violate

the

Constitution

or

require

a

subdivision to act contrary to a federal statute.

35. Id. at 91. As noted above, supra note 13, the distinction between a political
subdivision's public and proprietary character has largely been abandoned.
36. Id. at 92.
37. Id. at 91 -92.
38. Id.
3 9. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 1 6 1 , 178 (1 907).
40. Id.
41. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344 (1 960). The so-called "unconfined dicta"
actually said that a state:

at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation
such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial
area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy
the corporation. . . . In all these respects the State is supreme, and its legislative body,
conforming its action to the state Constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any
provision of the Constitution of the United States.
Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178-79.
42. Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178-79.
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If any doubt remained as to the scope of this line of cases, the
Court has since eliminated it. In

Trenton,

the Court definitively

limited these holdings to the Contract Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 3 The Court said that in the previous cases, no "power,
right or property of a city or other political subdivision [was] held to
be

protected

by

the

Contract

Clause

or

the

Fourteenth

Amendment." 4 4 In deciding the case before it, the Court held that "the
city cannot invoke

these provisions of the Constitution"

against the

state.4 5 The Court limited its holdings in these cases to the Contract
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment 4 6 and has subsequently
reaffirmed this limitation.4 7 It would be difficult for the Court to be
clearer than when it said that "a correct reading of the seemingly
unconfined dicta of
authority

is

Constitution

Hunter

unrestrained

and kindred cases is ... that the State's
by

the

considered in those

particular
cases." 4 8

prohibitions

Those

of

the

cases involved

municipal property, contracts, and boundaries; they established the
rule that a city may not seek the protection of the Contract Clause or
the Fourteenth Amendment against the state to protect its property,
contracts, or boundaries. The cases do not stand for a complete bar to
all suits by political subdivisions against their parent states.
II. EACH SUIT BY A P OLITICAL SUBDIVISION AGAINST ITS PARENT
STATE SHOULD BE DECIDED ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL MERITS,
NOT ON STANDING

This Part argues that Article III standing is not the dispositive
issue when a political subdivision sues its parent state, even though
some

Supreme

Court

cases

speak

of

a

political

subdivision's

"standing " to sue its parent state. In following these cases, the Sixth
and Ninth Circuits apply a per se rule denying "standing" to political
subdivisions in suits against their parent states.4 9 This Part begins by

43. City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 188 (1923) ("The power of the State,
unrestrained by the contract clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, over the rights and
property of cities held and used for 'governmental purposes' cannot be questioned.").
44. Id.
45. Id. at 192 (emphasis added). The provisions in question were the Contract Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 188.
46. Id. at 192; Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178-79; City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Water
Works, 142 U.S. 79, 92 (1891).
47. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344 (1960).
48. Id. at 344.
49. Palomar Pomerado Health Sys. v. Belshe, 180 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999)
(dismissing a health-care district's suit against its parent state of California because the
district, as a political subdivision, "lacks standing to bring an action against the state in
federal court - at least to the extent that its action challenges the validity of state
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showing that the Court has found that political subdivisions can meet
the modern requirements for standing. It then argues that the
confusion stems from the fact that "standing" had a different meaning
when the older cases in the

Hunter line were decided and that standing

was not the threshold issue it is today. It concludes by examining the
precedential cases to show that they were decided on the merits, not
on the jurisdictional question of standing.
Precedent shows that political subdivisions can meet the Article III
standing

requirements. The

Supreme

Court

ruled in

Board of

that school board officials have standing to

Education v. Allen

challenge state laws they allege to violate the Constitution.50 In
school board officials brought

suit

against

the

Allen,

state education

commissioner, claiming that a state law which required public school
districts

to

loan

textbooks

to

private

school

students

was

unconstitutional.51 The Court found standing for the board members
because they faced a choice between violating their oath to support
the Constitution should they follow the statute and losing their jobs
should they refuse to do so.52 The injury asserted by a political
subdivision

facing

a

choice

of

whether

to

follow an

allegedly

unconstitutional law or to face the consequences of disobedience thus
fits in the Article III standing requirements. It is an imminent harm,
causally related to the state's action, which can be remedied by an
injunction prohibiting enforcement of the state law or a judgment that
the state law is constitutional.53 The federal circuit courts which deny
"standing " do not address Allen and give only conclusory reasoning to
state that political subdivisions lack standing.54

regulations on due process and Supremacy Clause grounds."); Gwin Area Cmty. Sch. v.
Michigan, 741 F.2d 840, 844 (6th Cir. 1984) ("We agree with the district court's treatment of
the standing question. The school district, as a political subdivision of the State of Michigan,
was in no position to attack the state action as violative of the United States Constitution.").
50. Bd. ofEduc.

v.

Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).

51. Id. at 240.
52. Id. at 241 n.5. Justice White, the author of Allen, later dissented from the denial of
certiorari of a Ninth Circuit case on the grounds that the court's per se rule against suits by
political subdivisions against their parent states was inconsistent with Allen. City of S. Lake
Tahoe v. Cal. Tahoe Reg'! Planning Agency, 449 U.S. 1039 (White, J., dissenting).
53. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
54. See Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Kirk, 91 F.3d 1240, 1246
(9th Cir. 1996) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). As Judge Reinhardt explained:
South Lake Tahoe did not explain whether concerns about the standing of political
subdivisions or concerns about the constitutional rights they possess underlay its holding.
The court discussed the issue in a section of the opinion that concerned its jurisdiction and
was entitled 'The City's Standing'. However, it made no reference to the usual standing
criteria, and its reasoning, although elliptic, appears to be addressed to whether the city
possessed a cause of action. (citation omitted).

Id.
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The Sixth and Ninth Circuits, though, based their rule on a few
Supreme Court cases that declared that political subdivisions lacked
"standing" to bring Constitutional claims against their parent states.ss
The

Court,

in deciding

a

case

which did not

involve

political

subdivisions, said in dicta, "municipal corporations have no standing
to invoke the contract clause or the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution in opposition to the will of their
creator."s6 The Court has also said that political subdivisions were
"without

standing

to

invoke

the

protection

of

the

Federal

Constitution."57 This language was based on different conception of
standing and has misled some of today's courts into denying standing
to political subdivisions.
Reliance on the word "standing " by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits is
a case of judicial equivocation. Standing today has a distinct meaning58
and is a necessary element of federal-court jurisdiction that must be
satisfied before the court reaches the merits of a case.59 Standing did
not have this definite meaning in the early twentieth century when

Hunter, Trenton and

their progeny were decided.60 In the early part of

55. See City of S. Lake Tahoe v. Cal. Tahoe Reg'! Planning Agency, 625 F.2d 231, 233
(9th Cir. 1980) (citing Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933)); see also
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 441 (1939); Palomar Pomerado Health Sys. v. Belshe, 180
F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999); Gwin Area Cmty. Sch. v. Michigan, 741 F.2d 840, 844 (6th
Cir. 1984).
56. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 441. A municipal corporation, i.e., a city, is a species of
political subdivision. Coleman involved the validity of the Kansas legislature's approval of a
constitutional amendment, involving questions of the lieutenant governor's tie-breaking vote
in the State Senate, whether time had lapsed for approval of the amendment, and whether
the legislature could subsequently approve the amendment after previously rejecting it. Id.
at 433-38. As the Court's discussion of political subdivisions was unnecessary for its holding,
the language is dicta. It should be noted that the Court, even in dicta, limits the impact to the
Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.
57. Williams, 289 U.S. at 47.
58. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. The Court summarized standing law as follows:
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of - the injury has to be

-

fairly . .. traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the
independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
(internal quotations and citations omitted).

Id.

59. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (explaining that Article III "requires a
litigant to have 'standing' to invoke the power of a federal court").
60. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 224-25 (1988). As
Fletcher explained:
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a plaintiffs right to bring �uit was
determined by reference to a particular common law, statutory, or constitutional right, or
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this century, "[a] party had standing - or a 'right,to sue' - if it was
correct in its claim on the merits that the statutory or constitutional
provision in question protected its interests; standing was not seen as a
preliminary or threshold question."6 1 The Court's old conception of
standing is exemplified by

Works Co.62
"being

a

City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Water

In the case, the Court held that a political subdivision,

municipal

legislature, does not

corporation

and

stand in a position

the

creature

of

the

state

to claim the benefit of the

constitutional provision in question."6 3 The city thus had no standing,
as understood in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth
century to mean that the constitutional clause in question protected its
interests, to claim the benefit of the Contract Clause when its parent
state altered a contract the city had with a water company. This
holding does not mean that the city has no standing whatsoever, in the
modem sense, to bring constitutional claims against its parent state.
The precedential cases in this area were actually decided on the
merits.6 4

Hunter

held that the relationship between the citizens of a

city and the city itself is not a contract6 5 and that "inhabitants and
property owners . . . have no right, by contract or otherwise, in the
unaltered or continued existence of the corporation or its powers, and
there is nothing in the Federal Constitution which protects them from
these injurious consequences."66

Trenton

held that the state's power

over its political subdivisions was "unrestrained by the contract clause
or the Fourteenth Amendment. "6 7 The Court, therefore, held that "the
city

cannot

invoke these provisions of the

federal

Constitution

against . .. the state law in question."68 These cases were not dismissed

sometimes to a mixture of statutory or constitutional prohibitions and common law remedial
principles. . . . But no general doctrine of standing existed. Nor, indeed, was the term
'standing' used as the doctrinal heading under which a person's right to sue was determined.
(footnotes omitted).
"The creation of a separately articulated and self-conscious law of standing" began in the
last half of the twentieth century due to the emergence of the administrative state. Id. at 225.
A watershed case in the development of the standing doctrine was A ssociation of Data
Processing Service O rganizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The Lujan court
developed its three-part test from a survey of the Court's cases "over the years. " 504 U.S. at
560.

Id.

61. Rogers v. Blockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1070 (5th Cir. 1979).
62. 142 U.S. 79 (1891).
63.

Id.

at 89 (emphasis added). The clause in question was the Contract Clause.

64. See Alexander Willscher,
Challenges to State Law, 67 U. CHI.

Comment, The Justiciability
L. REV. 243, 250 (2000).

of Municipal Preemption

65. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 176-77 (1907).
66. Id.atl79.
67. City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 188 (1923).
68.

Id. at
Newa rk. City

192. The Court reached a similar conclusion in Trenton's companion case,
of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192 (1923). The Court held that "[t]he
enforcement by the state of the provision of the act .. . does not violate the equal protection
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for lack of jurisdiction, as they would be if they did not satisfy modem
standing requirements,69 but instead established a substantive rule that
the Contract Clause and the Due Process Clause do not protect
political subdivisions against actions by their parent states. They do
not establish a rule of standing whereby a political subdivision is
presumptively unqualified to bring federal legal actions against its
parent state.
Early twentieth century holdings regarding "standing" cannot be
applied today because of the drastically different meaning the term
had then. Continuing to analyze the status of political subdivisions
under the heading of "standing" breeds confusion and is not faithful to
precedent. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, "[t]he opinions in the

Hunter

and

Trenton

line of cases do occasionally - but by no means

uniformly - speak of 'standing.'" 7 0 The opinions do not reflect
anything resembling the modem test for standing, looking for actual
injury, causation, and whether the injury could be redressed by the
court.71 Analyzing past suits by political subdivisions using modem
standing doctrine is a misunderstanding of the

Trenton line

and of the

historical development of the standing doctrine.
Furthermore,
language" 7 2 in

"the

Williams

sweeping
v.

breadth

of

Justice

Mayor of Baltimore13 should

Cardozo's

not be allowed

to tum a rule developed for particular constitutional clauses into a
complete bar to suits by political subdivisions against their parent
states. In

Williams,

the Court said that a political subdivision "has no

privileges or immunities under the federal constitution which it may
invoke in opposition to the will of its creator." 7 4 Arguing that this case
means that political subdivisions can never invoke the Constitution
against its parent state involves a drastic overreacting of precedent.
This one sentence is the only support for such a universal rule, and the
first two cases cited for the proposition are

Trenton and its companion

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . The city cannot invoke the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment against the State." Id. at 196.
69. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 ("we finally arrive at the
threshold jurisdictional question: whether respondent, the plaintiff below, had standing to
sue").
70. Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1070 (5th Cir. 1979). See, for example, Trenton,
262 U.S. 182 (1923); Hunter v. City of Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161 (1�7); and City of New
Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works, 142 U.S. 79 (1891) for cases that do not use the word
"standing."
71. See, e.g. , Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see also Indian
Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Kirk, 91 F.3d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1996)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
72. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998).
73. 289 U.S. 36 (1933).
74. Id. at 40.
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City of Newark v. New Jersey.15 As this Note
Trenton, Newark, and their predecessors were

earlier,

has discussed
limited to the

constitutional clauses in question. If that were not enough, the
Supreme Court itself has said these cases stand for the proposition
that "the State's authority is unrestrained by the particular
prohibitions of the Constitution considered in these cases." 7 6
Courts today should follow the model established in

Water Works

and

Trenton,

New Orleans

deciding the case on the merits based on

the constitutional clauses in question. 7 7 These cases implicitly involved
the Supremacy Clause, because every attempt to invalidate a state law
on federal constitutional grounds includes a Supremacy Clause claim
to establish the primacy of federal law over state law. 7 8 The Supreme
Court in

New Orleans Water Works

and

Trenton

gave the political

subdivisions a fair hearing on their constitutional claims but ultimately
decided that the Constitution afforded them no protection under the
facts of their cases.7 9 Political subdivisions today deserve no less. Of
course, a political subdivision must realize that to win on the merits, it
must

overcome

the

broad powers

that

a

state

holds

over

its

subdivisions. States, though, should not be able to hide behind those
powers to shield themselves from all suits. The courts need to ensure
that states stay within their constitutional bounds in their treatment of
political subdivisions.

75. Id. (citing City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192 (1923); City of Trenton v.
New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923)).
76. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960).
77. See Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Reg') Transp. Auth., 653 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1981)
(dismissing a suit by a political subdivision against its parent state under the Fourteenth
Amendment because it was barred by precedent, including Newark and Williams).
78. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819). As Chief Justice Marshall
explained:
In discussing these questions, the conflicting powers of the general and state governments
must be brought into view, and the supremacy of their respective laws, when they are in
opposition, must be settled.
If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might expect it
would be this - that the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme
within its sphere of action. This would seem to result, necessarily, from its nature. It is the
government of all; its powers are delegated by all; it represents all, and acts for all. Though
any one state may be willing to control its operations, no state is willing to allow others to
control them. The nation, on those subjects on which it can act, must necessarily bind its
component parts. But this question is not left to mere reason: the people have, in express
terms, decided it, by saying, "this constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall
be made in pursuance thereof," "shall be the supreme law of the land."
Id.

79. See, e.g., Trenton, 262 U.S. at 192 ("We hold that the City cannot invoke these
provisions of the federal Constitution.").
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Ill. FEDERALISM SUPPORTS ALLOWING SUITS
Allowing suits by political subdivisions also fits with the nature of
our constitutional system. These suits merely allow federal courts to
ensure that states respect their constitutional limitations. Although
"the cases . . . reflect the general reluctance of federal courts to
meddle in disputes between state governmental units,"8 0 and the
federal courts should be very cautious about interfering in the internal
political organization of a state, federal courts have every right to
interfere with the internal political organization of a state if it violates
the Constitution.8 1 The Court has even said that "the power of the
legislature over all local municipal corporations is unlimited

save by
the restrictions of the state and Federal constitutions."82 Hunter and the

cases in its line held that certain activities of states, such as modifying
a contract of one of its subdivisions or annexing a smaller city to a
larger city, do not violate the Constitution. 8 3The power of a state over
its political subdivisions should guide a court when it decides the cases
on the merits, as it did in

Hunter

and

Trenton,

but should not act as a

complete bar to suits by political subdivisions.
Suits by political subdivisions that allege a violation of federal law
are in keeping with the structure of our federal system. These suits are
a restraint on states that act contrary to federal law, the supreme law
of the land. The federal government serves as a check on the state
governments just as state governments act as a check on federal
power.8 4 To this effect, the Court has quoted approvingly from the
Federalist Papers:
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government
will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state
government, and these will have the same disposition towards the
general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either
scale will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by
either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress.85

80. Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 755 (3d Cir. 1991).
81. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 345.
82. Williams v.Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304, 310 (1898) (emphasis added).
83. Trenton, 262 U.S. at 192; Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907);
City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works, 142 U.S. 79, 92 (1891). Of course, even
these actions may be unconstitutional. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346. The Court said that a state
is not insulated from judicial review in these matters of state interest if "state power is used
as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right." Id. at 347.
84. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("[A] healthy balance of power
between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse
on either front.").
85. Id. at 459 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 180-81 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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Some try to defend a per se rule on the grounds that suits by
subdivisions undercut the states' ability to serve as checks on federal
power. 86 This argument, though, misunderstands the dual nature of
our federal system. Federal protection is needed to ensure that states
operate within their constitutional bounds just as much as states are
needed to ensure that the federal government respects its limits. If the
states operate within

their bounds, they will have no problem

defeating suits by their political subdivisions.
Nor do suits by political subdivisions contravene notions of state
sovereignty because the proper scope of state sovereignty can only be
determined after an investigation of substantive federal law, which
provides the bounds of state sovereignty. A Supremacy Clause
challenge to a state law by its nature alleges that the state is acting
outside of its sovereign powers. Some argue that suits by political
subdivisions impede state sovereignty and unacceptably weaken states
in our federal system because a state's decision on its internal political
organization is an important element of state sovereignty that should
be left to the states without federal interference. 8 7 This argument fails
to note, though, that the bounds of state sovereignty can only be
determined by first addressing the merits of the subdivision's claim. If
a state

is acting within its constitutional

bounds,

the political

subdivision's suit will be dismissed on the merits, as in

Trenton.88

States still can rely on precedents like

Hunter

Hunter and
Trenton

and

to justify their decisions on the boundaries and powers they give to
their subdivisions. The broad powers of states over their subdivisions,
as defined in Hunter,89 also ensure that mere political disagreements
between states and their subdivisions will not end up in federal courts.
Suits based purely on political disagreement would be precluded
because a political subdivision must allege a conflict between state law
and a specific federal law to state a claim.90 The only problem for
states with suits by political subdivisions would be when they are

86. See Willscher, supra note 64, at 254 ("[S]tates sued by their municipalities will suffer
a blow to their dignity.").
87. Willscher, supra note 64, at 254-55.
88. It is interesting to note that the two most recent federal circuit court cases which
recognized political subdivisions' ability to sue their parent states ultimately rejected the
subdivisions' claims on the merits. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 643
(10th Cir. 1998); Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1073 (5th Cir. 1979).
89. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
90. Branson School D istrict, 161 F.3d at 630 ("[M]ere disagreement by a political
subdivision with the policies of its parent state will not be sufficient to overcome the
traditional barrier to political subdivision standing."). The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the
requirement that the state allegedly violate a controlling federal law eliminated the concern
about political subdivisions turning to federal courts whenever they disagreed with their
parent states. Id.
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acting unconstitutionally and hence cannot defend their actions based
on state sovereignty.

Washington
about

state

v.

Seattle School District No.

sovereignty

are

actually

1 9 1 shows how debates

debates

about

whether

a

constitutional violation exists in the first instance. Voters in the state
of Washington approved a ballot referendum requiring children to
attend the school nearest to their residences, and the Seattle, Tacoma,
and Pasco school districts brought suit to defend their now-illegal
busing programs used to achieve racial integration. 9 2 The Court, by a
five-to-four margin, held that the referendum was unconstitutional
because it subjected integration programs to "a debilitating and often
insurmountable disadvantage, " thus denying equal protection of the
law to minorities. 9 3 Justice Powell, for the four dissenting justices,
argued

that

the

Constitution

permitted

a

state

neighborhood schools program because "the State

to

adopt

a

- exercising its

sovereign authority over all subordinate agencies - should be free to
reject " mandatory busing in the absence of segregation. 9 4 What seems
to be a debate between those willing to interfere with state sovereignty
and those who are not is really a veiled debate about the protections
afforded by the Equal Protection Clause. The majority believed that
Washington violated the Equal Protection Clause with its law; the fact
that the law was passed through the popular political process was
therefore irrelevant. 9 5 The majority reached its conclusion because
"the State is obligated to operate [its educational] system within the
confines of the Fourteenth Amendment.That, we believe, it has failed
to do. " 96 The dissent, while using state sovereignty arguments, found

91. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
92. Id. at 459-64. The busing programs were initiated by the school districts, not in
response to a lawsuit or court order. Id. 460-61 . The proposed law said that "no school
board . . . shall directly or indirectly require any student to attend a school other than the
school which is geographically nearest or next nearest the student's place of residence." Id.
at 462 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 28.A.26.010 (1981)). The Court did not address the
specific issue of whether the school districts, as political subdivisions, could sue their parent
states. The Court indirectly answered the question by framing the issue as "not whether
Washington has the authority to intervene in the affairs of local school boards; it is, rather,
whether the State has exercised that authority in a manner consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause." Id. at 476.
93. Id. at 484. The Court did not analyze any standing issues, but seemed to assume that
a school district could raise the constitutional rights of individual minority students.
Community groups intervened in support of the districts, and these groups presumably had
standing to represent the interests of parents and students. See id. at 464.
94.

Id.

at 500 (Powell, J., dissenting).

95. Id. at 476 ("But 'insisting that a State may distribute legislative power as it
desires . . . furnish[es] no justification for a legislative structure which otherwise would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does the implementation of this change through
popular referendum immunize it."' (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969)).
96.

Seattle School District, 458

U.S. at 487.
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that there was no Equal Protection violation.9 7 Courts should consider
the broad powers of states over their subdivisions and notions of state
sovereignty when deciding whether a constitutional violation exists,
but not use them as a preemptive bar to all suits by political
subdivisions.
While state legislatures are the proper forums for working out
political questions in states, legislatures cannot avoid judicial review
merely by the fact that they represent the people.98 In the context of
political subdivisions, the Court has said that a "statute which is
alleged to have worked unconstitutional deprivations of petitioners'
rights is not
employed

immune

by

the

to attack simply because the mechanism

legislature

is

a

redefinition

of

municipal

boundaries."99 Defenders of a per se rule advance the arguments that
municipalities' interests the state political system protects and that any
conflict between states and their political subdivisions amounts to a
political question not appropriate for resolution in court.100 This
argument,

however,

suffers

from

the

same

weaknesses

as

the

argument based on state sovereignty because "insisting that a State
may distribute legislative powers as it desires . . . furnish[es] no
justification for a legislative structure which otherwise would violate"
the Constitution.1 0 1
Furthermore, there are mechanisms other than a per se ban on
suits by political subdivisions to ensure that purely political questions
stay out of the courts. Established doctrines, like the standing doctrine
and the political question doctrine, make certain that these purely
political disagreements stay out of the courts. 1 0 2 A court also can rule

97. Id. at 494 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The Court has held that 'the Equal Protection
Clause is not violated by the mere repeal of race-related legislation or policies that were not
required by the Federal Constitution in the first place."' (quoting Crawford v. L.A. Bd. of
Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 538 (1982)). Justice Powell also found the ballot initiative to be race
neutral and did not present significant enough burdens "such that interference with the
State's distribution of authority is justified." Id. at 495-96 (Powell, J., dissenting). The State
was free to legislate as it chose because there was no constitutional violation, but Justice
Powell did recognize that judicial intrusion could be justified if there were a violation. See id.
(Powell, J., dissenting).
98.

See Gomillion

v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960).

99. Id. The Court further elaborated that " (w]hen a State exercises power wholly within
the domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review. But such insulation is
not carried over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally
protected right." Id.
100. Willscher, supra note 64, at 258 ("The state lawmaking process is the exclusive
forum for working out controversies between a state and its municipalities.").
101.

Seattle School District,

102.

See

458 U.S. at 476.

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). As the Court explained:

Article III of the Constitution confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual "cases" and
'controversies' . . . . [T]he "case or controversy" requirement defines with respect to the
Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is
founded. The several doctrines that have grown up to elaborate that requirement are
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as a matter of law that a certain state action is properly resolved
through the political process; the Supreme Court did so in
regarding

municipal

annexations,

holding

that

"[t]he

Hunter

power

[to

authorize annexations] is in the State, and those who legislate for the
State are alone responsible for any unjust or oppressive exercise of
it." 1 0 3The subdivision's claim must be heard, though, because it alleges
that the state had no power to make the challenged law in the first
place either because it was unconstitutional or precluded by federal
law. The court must examine the state action in question before it can
decide whether it is best left to the political process. An

a priori

rule

that all state actions concerning its political subdivisions are political
matters not subject to judicial review contradicts

A llen's

resolution of

an Establishment Clause challenge to a state law by a school board 104
and

Gomillion's

warnings that state actions in areas traditionally left

exclusively to the state are reviewable if used as a pretext to
circumvent constitutional rights.1 05The real debate is about the proper
role

of

federal

law

as

applied

to

a

state's

internal

political

organization. These questions should be resolved explicitly in each
case on the merits, not through a per se rule preventing suits by
political subdivisions regardless of the constitutional clause or federal
law alleged to be violated. Thus, concerns that suits by political
subdivisions would give political subdivisions that lost in the political
process a "second bite at the apple" are misplaced.
While courts should allow suits by political subdivisions against
their parent states, they should continue, as they always have, to give
proper weight to issues of state sovereignty and the broad powers
states enjoy over their subdivisions. Some suits are foreclosed by
precedent, such as suits challenging state alterations of municipal
contracts under the Contract Clause and the Due Process Clause 106
and suits challenging the state's decisions as to the boundaries and
powers it gives to subdivisions under the same clauses. 1 0 7 Some federal

founded in concern about the proper - and properly limited - role of the courts in a
democratic society. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Id.
103. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907). Some actions that affect
political subdivisions clearly are not wholly within the domain of the state. It would be
ridiculous to argue that the exclusive forum for school boards to challenge loans of
textbooks to students at religious schools is the state legislature. See Bd. of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968). The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment clearly bears on the
question and so the issue is appropriate for judicial review. See id. at 242-44.
104. See A llen, 392 U.S.
105.

at 241 n.5.

Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 ( 1 960).

106. See, e.g. ,

City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S.

182, 188 (1923).

U.S. at 178-79. To successfully challenge these actions, a subdivision
would have to allege some sort of racial bias in the way the state drew the boundaries or
107. Hunter, 207
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to foreclose suits by

political subdivisions under the Equal Protection Clause, 1 0 8 though this
is in tension with Seattle School District, a Supreme Court case that
dealt with an Equal Protection claim brought by a school district
against its parent state. 1 0 9 Political subdivisions face an uphill battle to

succeed in their suits, meaning lawsuits will rarely be an effective

solution.U 0 Mere political disagreements between subdivisions and
their states do not belong in federal court, which should only be used
to resolve legitimate questions of the constitutionality of a state
action. 1 1 1
States may also be concerned that allowing political subdivisions to
sue under federal statutes via the Supremacy Clause will lead to undue
Congressional interference in state affairs. 1 1 2 To address this concern,
the Supreme Court provides states with protection from congressional
overreaching through its "working assumption that federal legislation
threatening to trench on the States' arrangements for conducting their
own governments should be treated with great skepticism, and read in
a way that preserves a State's chosen disposition of its own power." 1 1 3
The Court used this assumption to find that states could prevent their
subdivisions from providing telecommunications service, even though
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 says that "[n]o State . . . may
prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to

allocated powers to subdivisions. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347. Other avenues could
possibly succeed if the subdivision alleged that the state action was somehow a way of
"circumventing a federally protected right." Id.
108. Trenton, 262 U.S. at 188 ("The power of the state, unrestrained by
the . . . Fourteenth Amendment, over the rights and property of cities held and used for
'governmental purposes' cannot be questioned."). See, e.g., S. Macomb Disposal Auth. v.
Township of Washington, 790 F.2d 500, 505 (6th Cir. 1986); City of Moore v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 699 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1983).
109. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982). A political
subdivision would probably have to allege some sort of racial discrimination in the way its
parent state allocated powers to subdivisions, for example if a predominantly black city was
given inferior powers to a predominantly white city without an adequate justification. In any
event, the subdivision would be a proxy, asserting the right of its inhabitants to Equal
Protection.
110.

See supra

note 88.

111.

See supra

note 59.

112. At one time the Court found this reasoning persuasive and prevented Congress
from extending the Fair Labor Standards Act to state employees and the employees of
political subdivisions. Nat'! League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The Court found
that the Commerce Clause did not give Congress the power to "displace the States' freedom
to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." Id. at 852.
The Court soon retreated from this stance, though. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The Court found the "traditional government function" test is
not only "unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of federalism." Id.
at 531.
113. Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 124 S. Ct. 1555, 1565 (2004).
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provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service."11 4
Thus, courts will not infer that a statute was meant to interfere in the
relationship of a state and its subdivisions absent clear congressional
intent.1 1 5 States also can argue that a statute is unconstitutional
because it exceeds Congress's power under Article 1.1 1 6 Suits by
political subdivisions based on the Supremacy Clause merely require
that states act within their constitutional bounds by obeying applicable
Constitutional

provisions

possibility

Congressional

of

and

validly

passed

interference,

federal

however,

laws.

results

The
from

federal supremacy and the courts' expansive reading of Congress's
Article I powers,11 7 and is a problem for states whether or not political
subdivisions can sue their parent states.
IV. A SUBDIVISION'S NEED TO PROTECT ITSELF SUPPORTS
ALLOWING SUITS
Political subdivisions are created by states "as convenient agencies
for exercising such of the powers of the state as may be intrusted to
them."11 8 It is only reasonable to allow these agents the ability to
protest when they believe the state is asking them to do something
they could not do themselves, i.e., violate federal law. Political
subdivisions would be subject to lawsuits by individuals harmed by
these alleged violations of federal law,119 so political subdivisions
should have the ability to prospectively protect themselves from such

114. Id. at 1559 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000)). The Court interpreted the statute to
exclude political subdivisions because the text and legislative history did not show
congressional intent for their inclusion as "entit[ies]" under the Act. Id. at 1565.
115. Id. at 1565; Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256
(1985). Lawrence County involved a South Dakota statute that required subdivisions to
distribute federal payments in lieu of taxes (payments from the federal government to
substitute for taxes not collected by the subdivision on tax-exempt federal property) in the
same manner as they distribute local taxes. Id. at 258. The Court held the state statute
unconstitutional because "the language and legislative history of the federal statute indicate
that Congress intended local governments to have more discretion in spending federal aid
than the State would allow them." Id.
116. See Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1070-71 (5th Cir. 1979). The state's
arguments, if advanced today, would be limited by Garcia, but the state would still have
strong arguments under Hunter if Congress attempted to draw municipal boundaries or
interfere in a similar area of state interest.
117. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 560 ("[T]oday's decision effectively reduces the Tenth
Amendment to meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce
Clause.") (Powell, J., dissenting).
118. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
119. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Malcom, 803 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1986). The case involved a suit
by prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought against New York City's Department of
Corrections, and the city moved to join the State of New York as a third-party defendant.
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lawsuits by challenging the state action before they are forced to obey
an arguably unconstitutional law.1 2 0

Benjamin v. Malcolm,121

a Second Circuit case that addressed

solely modem standing requirements without considering the
and

Trenton line

Hunter

of cases, powerfully shows the need to allow political

subdivisions to sue their parent states. In

Benjamin, prisoners at a New

York City jail sued city prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1 983,
alleging overcrowding in violation of their constitutional rights under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.1 2 2 The district court granted
the city's motion to join the Governor and state prison commissioner
when the city alleged that state policies, including housing state
prisoners in city jails, contributed to the overcrowding.1 2 3 The state
appealed the joinder, arguing in part that the city had no standing to
press a joinder claim, an argument which the court found "needs little
discussion."1 2 4 Several

potential

injuries

gave

the

city

standing:

contempt sanctions from the court for noncompliance, the cost of
millions of dollars for more detention facilities, and the threat of
another riot if the state did not promptly remove its prisoners from the
city jails.1 2 5
A per se rule barring suits by subdivisions against their parent
states would allow the state to pass state violations of federal law, like
overcrowded prisons, and the resulting legal liabilities onto political
subdivisions without giving the subdivisions judicial recourse to make
the state pay its fair share. Suits by political subdivisions allow
subdivisions to protect themselves against their parent states and serve
to hold states accountable when states shift the blame for their
unconstitutional behavior onto subdivisions. As shown by Benjamin,
the state should not be able to pawn its constitutional wrongs off onto
its subdivisions and then claim that political subdivisions have no right

120. See Akron Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 1285, 1290 (6th Cir. 1974)
(recognizing "the right of a school board to resist in the federal courts pressures upon it to
prevent its performance of its duties in accord with the Constitution of the United States")
(citing Brewer v. Hoxie School District No. 46, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956)). The
constitutional duty in the case was the duty to provide racially integrated schools. Id.
121. 803 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1986).
122.

Id.

at 47.

123. Id. at 49. The city was detaining state offenders until they could be moved to state
facilities. Id. The district court ordered the state to take the prisoners within forty-eight
hours, "finding that the State's failure promptly to take these prisoners off the City's hands
strained the latter's facilities beyond constitutionally tolerable limits so that the State was in
effect simply seeking to spread the burden of impermissible overcrowding rather than
eliminating it." Id.
124.

Id.

at 54.

125. Id. The Court did not mention the fact that the City could be subject to § 1983
money damages allegedly due in part to state conduct, which seems to be another potential
injury to the city.
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under federal law to challenge state actions. In fact, the state could
avoid political accountability for some of its constitutional wrongs by
shifting

the

responsibility

blame
for

to
the

subdivisions
violations

and

to

transferring

local

the

taxpayers.

fiscal

Political

subdivisions should have judicial recourse to avoid this kind of blame
shifting by the state.
Furthermore, a per se rule could keep the party in the best position
to claim an injury out of court. In fact, the standing doctrine
sometimes makes political subdivisions the only parties in a position to
challenge a state action, as exemplified by

Rogers.

In

Rogers,

a school

district challenged a state law that required it to provide breakfast at
school, claiming that the law forced it to expend money to administer
an allegedly unconstitutional law.1 26 A taxpayer likely would not have
standing to challenge the state law based solely on the expenditure of
funds.1 2 7 A student's claim that an expenditure of money on breakfasts
would entail less money for other programs might not suffice to confer
standing on the student, as a court could find that the interest in funds
is not particular to that student. 1 2 8 The school board is the party in the
best position to bring suit, and the only one that definitely meets the
Article III standing requirements.1 2 9 It is most familiar with federal
and state education law, is in the best position to know of a potential
conflict, and faces the most direct injury from the state law, the same
injury the Court recognized in

Allen.

The per se rule could possibly

126. Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1059-60 (5th Cir. 1979).
127. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454
U.S. 464, 478 (1982) ("This Court has held that the interests of a taxpayer in the moneys of
the federal treasury are too indeterminable, remote, uncertain and indirect to furnish a basis
for an appeal to the preventive powers of the Court over their manner of expenditure."); see
also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487-88 (1923) (holding that an individual
taxpayer suffered an injury only in an "indefinite way in common with people generally"
when challenging the expenditure of funds, and so there was no justiciable case).
128. See supra note 127. The student would have to show an "injury in fact," for
example, that somehow the expenditure of money on the school breakfasts consequently
reduced spending in another area which hurt him. This may be difficult to prove and could
be rejected as analogous to the problems associated with taxpayer standing. See Mellon, 262
U.S. at 487-88 (dismissing taxpayer's suit claiming that an expenditure of funds was
unconstitutional because the spending did not cause the taxpayer an injury distinct from
people generally). While municipal taxpayers have standing to challenge their municipality's
actions which result in the expenditure of municipal funds, see, e.g. , United States v. City of
New York, 972 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1992), they do not necessarily have standing to
challenge state actions that cause their municipality to spend money, see Bd. of Educ. v. New
York State Teachers Retirement Sys., 60 F.3d 106, 1 1 1 (2d. Cir. 1995). But see Gwin Area
Cmty. Sch. v. Michigan, 741 F.2d 840, 844 (6th Cir. 1 984) (finding standing for municipal
taxpayers to challenge state action). Thus, the school district may be the only party with
Article III standing to sue.
129. The school board would have standing under Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
241 n.5 (1968), and under the court's reasoning in Rogers, 588 F.2d at 1059-60,as was noted
in supra Part I.
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leave no one with standing to bring suit, effectively barring judicial
review of the allegedly unconstitutional state action.
Another possible important use for suits by political subdivisions is
to protect themselves when acting more as private entities than
governments, such as employers, health care providers and other
functions not unique to governments.1 30 The need for such protection
is increasing as states create more subdivisions that blend public and
private functions, like the Business Improvement District, which
"[c]ombin[es] public and private, as well as city government and
neighborhood elements" to improve the quality of life and business
environment of the district.1 31 Allowing suits by subdivisions acting as
businesses while preventing others would run close to the now
abandoned distinction between subdivisions acting in their public
capacity and acting in their private, proprietary capacity.1 32 As noted
above, 1 33 the Court has recognized the ability of Congress to regulate
the employment of state and municipal employees. 1 34 If a state tried to
prevent its subdivisions from complying with the federal workplace
guidelines, the subdivisions would have a good argument to enjoin the
enforcement of such an action. While the individual workers would
also have standing to challenge the state action, there is no good
reason why a political subdivision acting as an employer should be
forced to sit out and risk hurting relations with its employees, merely
because it is an agent of the state.
provides a good example of an area in which
subdivisions may be needed to ensure state

Palomar Pomerado
suits

by

political

compliance with federal law. Palomar Pomerado was a state-created
health care district formed under California law that provided nursing

130. See City of Cleveland v. Indus. Comm'n, 455 N.E.2d 1085, 1089 (Ohio Ct. App.
1983) (distinguishing Trenton because "the actions in this case are proprietary in nature as
they relate to the employer-employee relationship like any other Ohio employer"). The case
was a dispute over whether the state Industrial Commission could collect premiums from the
City of Cleveland, which had been underbilled as a result of a mistake by the Commission.
Id. at 1086-87. The court found that the Commission's practice of not billing employers for
underbilled premiums, if the error was not discovered for more than two years after the
original bill was submitted, should apply to the city as well as to private corporations and
individuals. Id. at 1089-90.
131. Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts
99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 366-67 (1999) (reporting that there are over
one thousand Business Improvement Districts in the United States, with many being created
in the 1990s). The health care districts in Palomar Pomerado similarly provided a service,
health care, that often is provided by private entities. See Palomar Pomerado Health Sys. v.
Belshe, 180 F.3d 1 104 (9th Cir. 1999).
and Urban Governance,

132 See, e.g. , City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 191 (1923). The distinction
has been described as a "quagmire" and "has largely been abandoned." S. Macomb Disposal
Auth. v. Township of Washington, 790 F.2d 500, 505 (6th Cir. 1986). But see City of
Cleveland, 455 N.E.2d at 1089.
133.

See supra

note 112.

134. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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services.U 5 Palomar Pomerado alleged that the state's formula for
reimbursement under the state health insurance plan was below the
federally mandated rates under Medicaid.1 36 If Palomar Pomerado's
allegations were true, California could subvert federal health care
policy merely by forming health care subdivisions, and the Ninth
Circuit's per se rule would preclude review.1 37 Conceivably, a state
could undermine federal schemes for health care, or any other issue,
by forming political subdivisions. Of course, California's plan may
have been perfectly consistent with federal law, but its legality was
never tested because the Ninth Circuit's per se rule precluded a
judgment on the merits. Courts should tread carefully when judging a
state's actions, but a per se rule would deny a court the opportunity of
reviewing even the most egregious state violations of federal laws
merely because the complaining party is a political subdivision.
V.

THE NATURE OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE ALONE I S THE

PROPER RATIONALE FOR ALLOWING P OLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS TO
SUE THEIR PARENT STATES

The Constitution makes federal law supreme, whether it be a
statute, a treaty or the Constitution itself. Therefore the Supremacy
Clause alone requires that political subdivisions be allowed to prove
that a state is violating any controlling federal law. More complex
rationales for allowing such suits, like those employed by the Tenth
Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, impose additional limitations which are
inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause. Part V.A analyzes and rejects
the reasoning the Tenth Circuit used to allow subdivision suits to
proceed on the merits. Part V.B finds the Fifth Circuit's rationale to
be an overreading of the precedent. Part V.C shows that the
Supremacy Clause gives political subdivisions the ability to argue that
a state law violates either the Constitution or a controlling federal law.
A.

The Tenth Circuit's Rationale Misreads the Precedent

The Tenth Circuit used a distinction between individual rights and
structural rights when it allowed a suit by a school district against its
parent state.1 38 The court read the

Trenton

line of cases as standing

135. Palomar Pomerado Health Sys. v. Belshe, 180 F.3d 1104, 1 106 (9th Cir. 1999).
136. Id. The Ninth Circuit never reached the merits of the claim because it followed the
Circuit's per se rule against suits by political subdivisions against their parent states. Id. at
1108.
137. Id. at 1108.
138. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 628-30 (10th Cir. 1998). The case
involved a Colorado referendum that changed the managing principles of its public lands
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"only for the limited proposition that a municipality may not bring a
constitutional

challenge

against

its

creating

state

when

the

constitutional provision that supplies the basis for the complaint was
written to protect individual rights, as opposed to collective or
structural rights." 1 39 The court found the Supremacy Clause to be a
structural protection and thus not barred by the

Trenton

line. 14 0 The

court held that the subdivision must be "substantially independent"
from its parent state to proceed with its suit and found school districts
in Colorado to be independent from the state government.14 1
While the Tenth Circuit was creative in its reading of precedent, its
creativity does more to confuse the issue than to clarify it. The initial
problem is the distinction between individual and structural rights,
which does not come from Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Tenth
Circuit imported concepts into the precedents that the Court did not
consider. The Supreme Court in

Hunter, Trenton,

and like cases did

not draw distinctions between constitutional provisions that protected
individuals and those that were structural protections. Further, the
Court

in those cases hinted that municipalities could seek the

protections of the Constitution for property or contracts held in its
proprietary capacity, showing that the Court was not completely
opposed to giving municipalities the protection of "individual rights"
in certain circumstances.14 2 The Court's holdings in the precedential
cases were based on the powers states have over their subdivisions,
not on whether the right involved was individual or structural. For
example, the Court in

Trenton found that the Contract

Clause did not

protect the city's contract with the water company because the state
controlled the city's powers to make contracts and the state could
therefore modify the city's contract, not because the Contract Clause
is an individual right which does not protect political subdivisions. 14 3

trust. Id. at 626. The land trust was established by Congress when Colorado entered the
Union; thus the school district argued that the Supremacy Clause did not allow the state to
override the terms provided by Congress. Id.
139.

Id.

at 628.

140.

Id.

at 629.

141.

Id. The court followed the reasoning of the
rel. A rizona Highway Department, 385 U.S. 458,

Supreme Court in Lassen v. A rizona ex
459 n.1 (1967). School districts were
independent because state law allowed them to hold property in their own name, to enter
into contracts, and to sue and be sued in their own name, and because they were led by
independently elected school boards. Branson School District, 161 F.3d at 630. Most political
subdivisions would meet this test.
142. City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 191 (1923); Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907) ("It will be observed that in describing the absolute
power of the State over the property of municipal corporations we have not extended it
beyond the property held and used for governmental purposes."). The distinction has largely
disappeared, see supra note 13, but its existence shows that the Court at the time was not
analyzing the problem based on the categories of individual and structural rights.
143.

Trenton,

262 U.S. at 188.
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determining

the

Circuit

also

difference

did

not

between

provide
an

any

individual

1925
guidance
right

in

and

a

structural right or cite cases that illustrate the distinction; it merely
stated that the Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment
protect individual rights and that the Supremacy Clause is a structural
right. 1 4 4 The court did not address the fact that the Supremacy Clause
is not a right but only a gateway to challenge a state law on federal
grounds.
In addition, the distinction does not accurately reflect the Supreme
Court's decisions in this area. The Court in Allen allowed a suit by a
school board challenging a state law on the grounds that it violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 1 45 The protections of
the First Amendment, along with the whole Bill of Rights, seem to b e
best classified a s individual rights. One could argue, however, that the
Establishment Clause is a structural right because it prevents the
establishment of a state religion and keeps religion out of the structure
of government. The difficulty in deciding the question, though, further
points out the confusing nature of the Tenth Circuit's distinction
between individual rights and structural rights. The distinction also
does not account for the Supreme Court's decision in

District,

Seattle School

which overturned a state neighborhood-schools law that was

challenged by school districts on Equal Protection grounds. 1 46 The
Tenth Circuit lists the Fourteenth Amendment as an individual right,
yet the Supreme Court granted relief to a school district against its
parent state on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. To be fair, the
Supreme Court itself, in

Seattle School District,

did not explicitly

address the issue examined in this Note. It is not helpful, however, to
add a poorly defined distinction on top of an already confusing area of
law.
B.

The Fifth Circuit Comes Closer to the Mark, but Still Falls Short

The Fifth Circuit read the

Trenton

line of cases to stand for the

proposition that "the Constitution does not interfere in the internal
political organization of states." 1 4 7 The court read the cases in
harmony with a principle dating back to Chief Justice Marshall:
[T]he framers of the constitution did not intend to restrain the states in
the regulation of their civil institutions, adopted for internal government,
and . . . the instrument they have given us, is not to be so construed . . . .

144.

Branson School District,

161 F.3d at 628-29.

145. Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
146. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
147. Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1069 (5th Cir. 1979).
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. . . If the act . . . be a grant of political power, if it create a civil institution
to be employed in the administration of government . . . the subject is
one in which the legislature of the state may act according to its own
judgment, unrestrained by any limitation of its power imposed by the
constitution of the United States.148

The Fifth Circuit then reasoned that while the Constitution does not
interfere in states' internal political organization, "[t]here is every
reason to think that Congress may interfere with a state's internal
political organization in ways that the Constitution itself does not."1 4 9
Therefore, the court allowed the school district to argue its claim that
Texas's

school

breakfast

statute contravened the federal school

breakfast statute.1 5 0
The Fifth Circuit's reading of precedent is more accurate than the
Tenth Circuit's reading, but it still lacks the necessary precision. The
court,

while

noting

constitutional

limits

that
on

a

the

Supreme

Court

has

recognized

state's power over its subdivisions, 1 5 1

interpreted the precedential cases as standing for an absolute rule that
gives the Constitution no role in the political organization of states. 1 5 2
This absolute rule contradicts Supreme Court cases, even those cited
by the court; most notably,
Amendment

limits a

Gomillion acknowledged that the Fifteenth

state's ability to draw the borders of its

subdivisions, particularly when done for racial reasons.1 5 3 In a slightly
different context, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause
limits a state's ability to apportion the seats in its state legislature1 5 4
and draw voting districts for its political subdivisions.1 5 5 The Court,
while consistently recognizing the broad powers of states over their
subdivisions, has noted that the "the power of the legislature over all
local municipal corporations is unlimited save by the restrictions of the

148.
(1819)).

Id.

(quoting Tr. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 629-30

149. Rogers, 588 F.2d at 1070. The case was decided while National League of Cities v.
426 U.S. 833 (1976), was still good law, so Congress was bound by the holding that
"there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be
impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative
authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the
authority in that manner." Id. at 845.
Usery,

150.

Rogers,

151.

Id.

152

Id.

153.

Id.

588 F.2d at 1071.

at 1069.
(citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)).

154. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). While
legislative districts are not political subdivisions as understood for the purposes of this Note,
legislative districts would seem to fit the Fifth Circuit's broad language of "internal political
organization." Rogers, 588 F.2d at 1069. At the very least, the Fifth Circuit needs to refine its
definition of "internal political organization" to exclude voting districts.
155. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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state and Federal constitutions."1 5 6 The Fifth Circuit would have been
better to avoid such a categorical denial of the constitutional limits on
state power over its internal political organization. While the Court
ha.s not recognized many limits, some cases do run afoul of the
constitutional limits, and the Fifth Circuit's categorical phrasing would
preclude review of these cases merely because the complaining party
is a subdivision. 1 5 7
C.

The Supremacy Clause Itself Provides the Rationale for Suits

Although both circuits used faulty rationales in reaching the
conclusion to recognize suits by political subdivisions, they both
contain the seeds

of

the proper reasoning. The Tenth

Circuit

recognized that federal law "trumps any contradictory state law
through the operation of the Supremacy Clause."1 5 8 The Constitution
makes federal law supreme, so political subdivisions should be given
the opportunity to prove that a state is transgressing a controlling
federal law, whether it be a statute, treaty, or the Constitution itself. It
is antithetical to the supremacy of federal law to forbid a court from
deciding a case on the merits if it is brought by a party who meets the
standing requirements and involves a claim that a state is acting
contrary to federal law. The nature of the Supremacy Clause demands
that a political subdivision receive the opportunity to prove its case in
court; it may win or lose, but at least the case should be heard. A rule
of this kind "simply allows a political subdivision to sue its parent state
when the suit alleges a violation by the state of some controlling
federal law."1 5 9
The Fifth Circuit and Tenth Circuit allow suits based on
controlling federal law, but do not extend this to constitutional
challenges.1 60 The Supremacy Clause logic that would allow suits based

156. Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304, 310 (1898).
157. The Eleventh Amendment acts as an independent limitation on suits against states,
and such independent limitations should be honored. There is no such explicit limitation on
suits by political subdivisions, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar most suits by
political subdivisions because they seek injunctions to prevent continuing violations of
federal law and not money damages. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (citing Ex
parte Young, 209 US 123, 155-56, 159 (1908)). As the Court said in Green, "the availability of
prospective relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause.
Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate
the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law." Green, 474 U.S. at 68. This
reasoning works for all suits of this kind, whether brought by political subdivisions or not.
158. Branson School Dist. v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 630 (10th Cir. 1998).
159.

Id.

160. Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1069 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[T)he Constitution does
not interfere with a state's internal organization of its political functions."). See Branson
School District, 161 F.3d at 628 ("[W)e conclude that a political subdivision has standing to
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on federal law works equally well with suits based on the Constitution.
The Supremacy Clause makes both the Constitution and laws passed
by Congress supreme, so a distinction between federal statutes on one
hand and the Constitution on the other makes no sense. Courts should
not adopt a flat rule that the Constitution never intrudes on a state's
regulation of its subdivision, as the Fifth Circuit appeared to do,
because the precedent in this area involved the application of specific
constitutional provisions to specific state actions. 1 6 1 Rules developed in
cases of annexations and charter alterations should not be extended
blindly to the cases

of today, which involve issues like prison

conditions and the interaction of federal and state education law.
While the Constitution has often afforded no protection to the
municipalities in past cases, it may provide protection in the future
under different circumstances.1 6 2 Courts should see cases like

Hunter

as guides, not as dispositive of the issues. Each case should be decided
on whether the state law in question violates the Constitution or an
applicable

federal

law.

As

noted by the Tenth

Circuit,

"[t]he

Supremacy Clause guarantees no less. "1 6 3
CONCL US ION
Political subdivisions should be allowed to sue their parent states
when they allege a conflict between state law and federal law, whether
the Constitution, a treaty, or a statute. The circuits that dismiss these
cases based on "standing" misinterpret the precedent from a time
when " standing" had a different meaning than the jurisdictional
meaning it has today. The Supreme Court precedent in this area does
not foreclose these suits, and in fact a decision on the merits in each
case would be in keeping with the precedents, which themselves were
decisions on the merits. In addition, these suits help ensure that states
comply with federal law and give political subdivisions an option when
their parent states ask them to follow an arguably unconstitutional

bring a constitutional claim against its creating state when the substance of the claim relies
on the Supremacy Clause and a putatively controlling federal law."). The Tenth Circuit does
not explicitly bar claims based on the Supremacy Clause coupled with a constitutional
provision, but its use of "federal law" seems aimed at federal statutes. See id.
161.

See supra

Part I.

162. See Ala. NAACP State Conference v. Wallace, 269 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
Alabama passed a statute that prohibited local school districts from complying with the
school desegregation requirements of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 349. The
federal district court held that the action by the Alabama legislature violated the Supremacy
Clause. Id. A political subdivision would have a strong argument against a similar attempt by
a state legislature to supersede federal law, showing that federal law might sometimes
intrude upon a state's "internal political organization."
163.

Branson School District,

161 F.3d at 630.
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law. Political subdivisions should receive the same protection from the
Supremacy Clause that every other entity enjoys.

